

PLSC 424-001: Topics in Comparative Government and Institutions
Executive-Legislative Politics

Instructor: Jinhyuk Jang

Time: Monday, Wednesday, Friday 3:35 - 4:25 p.m.
Place: Willard Building 165

Instructor Contact Information:

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Office: Pond 314 (Office hours will be temporarily held on Zoom)

Office Hours: 10:30 - 11:30 a.m. Mondays and Wednesdays (and by appointment)

Description

Why do some democracies have multiple national-level elections in the same year, as a result of a failure to “form a government”? Why do we see power-sharing in the form of coalition cabinets in some countries, or at some times, but not others? What are the consequences of this power-sharing between parties within the government (executive)? What’s the role of a monarch in the modern executive-legislative relationship?

This course is about executive-legislative relations in contemporary democracies around the globe. These democracies can be distinguished from each other in terms of how the executive *comes* to power and how the executive *remains* in power. Governments make policies that affect the daily lives of citizens. The policymaking outcomes and the stability of governments are influenced by the bargaining between the executive and the legislature. We will begin with a focus on the formation, survival, and termination of governments in parliamentary, semi-presidential, and presidential democracies. To do so, we will learn about the differing dynamics of executive-legislative relations across these regime types. Who has power to affect policy changes, and under what conditions? In addition to topics related to government life cycles, we will investigate how the different forms of democratic government influence important political outcomes such as economic policy, political stability, and democratic survival. Throughout this course, you will be able to explore how different institutional arrangements produce varied political outcomes in Europe, Latin America, Africa, and the Asia-Pacific region.

Required Texts

There is no required book for the class. Readings will be available on the course Canvas site.

Course Goals

The purpose of this course is to understand how the different types of institutional arrangements used by democracies operate around the world, and to examine how these institutional choices affect policy outcomes and political stability. To do so, we will investigate arguments presented in existing scholarship and evaluate their strengths and weaknesses. We will use various information sources, such as books, journal articles, news articles, and other media sources. You will write short memos and deal with actual data on governments. The goal is to apply theories of executive-legislative relations to our real life context in this class.

Some of the concepts presented in the readings and in lecture may require a reasonable amount of effort to understand. To test some of the observable implications of the theories, some of the political science readings we cover may use methods that will be entirely new to you. You do not have to be perfectly familiarized with all of the methodological tools used in the readings. Rather, I hope to offer you sufficient information through discussion and lecture so that you can assess the arguments we read. I hope to help you understand the dynamics of executive-legislative relations and their consequences for the quality of democracy by the end of this semester.

Requirements

Attendance is important and serves as a good predictor of a student's performance on exams. Those who miss class are encouraged to get notes from a fellow student.

You will take two midterm exams. Regular 'homework' assignments will include a mixture of in-class and out-of-class assignments. Some of these assignments will involve collecting data or writing short memorandums. Finally, you will take a (cumulative) final exam.

Late homework assignments will incur a penalty that increases with time elapsing from the due date. Exam makeups will be permitted in extenuating circumstances, at the instructor's discretion. Those who are sick or have a university-accepted excuse for missing an exam, please let me know *prior* to the test date to the extent that this is possible.

Grades

Your final grade will be a weighted average of the following elements: Midterm 1 and Midterm 2 are *each* worth 20% and the final (cumulative) exam is worth 30%. Homework is worth 20%. The final 10% is based on your attendance. I will use the following scale to calculate your course grade: A (93-100), A- (90-92.9), B+ (87-89.9), B (83-86.9), B- (80-82.9), C+ (77-79.9), C (70-76.9), D (60-69.9), F (59.9 and below).

Exam Dates

Midterm 1: September 27, 2021.

Midterm 2: November 1, 2021.

Final Exam: Date and time to be announced - sometime the week of December 13.

Schedule

This syllabus provides a tentative schedule for our class. It is possible that more or less time will be invested in a particular topic than I have allocated here. Note, however, that *the exam dates will not be changed*. The course website will include due dates for homework assignments and provide information on any schedule revisions. It is your responsibility to check the schedule regularly so that you are aware of all assignments.

Week 1: August 23 - 27 – Course Introduction & Scope. Measuring Democracy/Dictatorship.

REQUIRED READING:

Clark et al. 2017. Excerpt from Chapter 5 (“Democracy and Dictatorship: Classifying Democracies and Dictatorships”) in *Principles of Comparative Politics*. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Pages 150-164.

Cheibub, Gandhi, & Vreeland. 2010. Excerpt from “Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited.” *Public Choice* 143: 67-101. Pages 67-79 (Sections 1-3).

Week 2: August 30 - September 3 – Types of Democracy

REQUIRED READING:

Clark et al. 2017. Excerpt from Chapter 12 (“Parliamentary, Presidential, and Semi-Presidential Democracies: Classifying Democracies”) in *Principles of Comparative Politics*. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Pages 454-460.

Cheibub, Gandhi, & Vreeland. 2010. Excerpt from “Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited.” *Public Choice* 143: 67-101. Pages 79-83 (Section 4.1).

RECOMMENDED READING:

Duverger. 1980. "A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government." *European Journal of Political Research* 8: 165-187.

No Class on Monday, September 6 (Labor Day)

Week 3: September 6 - 10 – Government Formation. Types of Government. Which Parties Get In?

REQUIRED READING:

Clark et al. 2017. Excerpt from Chapter 12 (“Parliamentary, Presidential, and Semi-Presidential Democracies: Making and Breaking Governments”) in *Principles of Comparative Politics*. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Pages 458 - 481.

Hazell & Yong. 2012. Excerpt from Chapter 3 ("Formation of the Coalition") in *The Politics of Coalition: How the Conservative-Liberal Democratic Government Works*. Oxford: Hart Publishing Ltd. Pages 28-35.

Gilmore. 2016. Excerpt from Chapter 4 ("Forming a National Government") in *Inside the Room: The Untold Story of Ireland's Crisis Government*. Ireland: Merrion Press. Pages 70-91.

RECOMMENDED READING:

Strøm, Budge & Laver. 1994. “Constraints on Cabinet Formation in Parliamentary Democracies.” *American*

Journal of Political Science. 38(2): 303-335.

Martin & Stevenson. 2001. "Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies." *American Journal of Political Science* 45(1): 33-50.

Glasgow, Golder & Golder. 2011. "Who 'Wins'? Determining the Party of the Prime Minister." *American Journal of Political Science* 55(4): 937-54.

Golder, Golder, & Siegel. 2012. "Modeling the Institutional Foundation of Parliamentary Government Formation." *The Journal of Politics* 72(2): 427-445.

Week 4: September 13 - 17 – Portfolio Allocation I. Gamson's Law.

REQUIRED READING:

Clark et al. 2017. Excerpt from Chapter 12 ("Parliamentary, Presidential, and Semi-Presidential Democracies: Portfolio Allocation and Gamson's Law") in *Principles of Comparative Politics*. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Pages 470 - 471.

Warwick & Druckman. 2006. "The portfolio allocation paradox: An investigation into the nature of a very strong but puzzling relationship." *European Journal of Political Research* 45: 635-665.

RECOMMENDED READING:

Gamson. 1961. "A theory of coalition formation." *American Sociological Review*: 373-382.

Baron & Ferejohn. 1989. "Bargaining in Legislatures." *American Political Science Review* 83(4): 1181-1206.

Laver, De Marchi & Mutlu. 2011. "Negotiation in Legislatures over Government Formation." *Public Choice*. 147(3/4): 285-304.

Ono. 2012. "Portfolio Allocation as Leadership Strategy: Intraparty Bargaining in Japan." *American Journal of Political Science* 56(3): 553-567.

Week 5: September 20 - 24 – Who Gets to be a Minister? Identity and Entering the Cabinet.

REQUIRED READING:

Alexiadou. 2015. "Ideologues, Partisans, and Loyalists: Cabinet Ministers and Social Reform in Parliamentary Democracies." *Comparative Political Studies* 48: 1051-1086.

Franceschet, Annesley & Beckwith. 2017. "What Do Women Symbolize? Symbolic Representation and Cabinet Appointments." *Politics, Groups, and Identities* 5(3): 488-493.

Choice of either:

Escobar-Lemmon & Taylor-Robinson. 2005. "Women Ministers in Latin American Government: When, Where, and Why?" *American Journal of Political Science* 49: 829-844.

Or:

Lee and Park. 2018. "Democratization and Women's Representation in Presidential Cabinets: Evidence from East and Southeast Asia." *Asian Journal of Political Science* 26(2): 161-180.

RECOMMENDED READING:

Krook & O'Brien. 2012. "All the President's Men? The Numbers and Portfolio Allocations of Female Cabinet Ministers." *Journal of Politics* 74: 840-855.

Arriola & Johnson. 2014. "Ethnic Politics and Women's Empowerment in Africa: Ministerial Appointments to Executive Cabinets." *American Journal of Political Science* 58: 495-510.

Week 6: September 27 - October 1 – Midterm 1 (Monday). No Class (Wednesday, Friday).

1st Midterm Exam on Monday, September 27.

**No Class on Wednesday or Friday, September 29 - October 1
(Instructor at Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.)**

Week 7: October 4 - 8 – Portfolio Allocation II. Presidential vs. Parliamentary.

REQUIRED READING:

Clark et al. 2017. Excerpt from Chapter 12 ("Parliamentary, Presidential, and Semi-Presidential Democracies: The Composition of Presidential Cabinets") in *Principles of Comparative Politics*. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Pages 491 - 493.

Amorim Neto & Samuels. 2010. "Democratic Regimes and Cabinet Politics: A Global Perspective." *Revista Ibero-Americana de Estudos Legislativos* 1(1): 10-23.

Ariotti & Golder. 2018. "Partisan Portfolio Allocation in African Democracies." *Comparative Political Studies* 51(3): 341-379.

RECOMMENDED READING:

Jang. 2021. "Partisan Distribution of Ministerial Portfolios: Dividing the Pie Between Coalition Partners in Asia-Pacific Democracies." Presented at the Asian Politics Online Seminar Series, July 2021.

Golder & Thomas. 2014. "Portfolio Allocation and the Vote of No Confidence". *British Journal of Political Science*, 44(1): 29-39.

Amorim Neto. 2006. "The Presidential Calculus: Executive Policy Making and Cabinet Formation in the

Americas." *Comparative Political Studies* 39(4): 415-440.

Amorim Neto & Strøm. 2006. "Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-Partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies." *British Journal of Political Science* 36(4): 619-643.

Lee. 2018. "Executive Capacity to Control Legislatures and Presidential Choice of Cabinet Ministers in East Asian Democracies." *Governance* 31(4): 777-795.

Week 8: October 11 - 15 – Portfolios & Patronage (Presidential and Semi-Presidential Regimes).

REQUIRED READING:

Clark et al. 2017. Excerpt from Chapter 12 ("Parliamentary, Presidential, and semi-Presidential Democracies: Making and Breaking Governments") in *Principles of Comparative Politics*. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Pages TBA.

Arriola. 2009. "Patronage and Political Stability in Africa." *Comparative Political Studies* 42: 1339-1362.

Kellam. 2015. "Parties for Hire: How Particularistic Parties Influence Presidents' Governing Strategies." *Party Politics* 21(4): 515-526.

RECOMMENDED READING:

Cheibub, Przeworski, & Saiegh. 2004. "Government Coalitions and Legislative Success under Presidentialism and Parliamentarism." *British Journal of Political Science* 34: 565-587.

Amorim Neto & Strøm. 2006. "Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies". *British Journal of Political Science* 36: 619-643.

Week 9: October 18 - 22 – Legislative Fractionalization (# of Parties).

REQUIRED READING:

Clark et al. 2017. Chapter 14 ("Social Cleavages and Party Systems": Number of Parties - Duverger's Theory) in *Principles of Comparative Politics*. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Pages 621-639.

Laver & Benoit. 2015. "The Basic Arithmetic of Legislative Decisions." *American Journal of Political Science* 59(2): 275-291.

RECOMMENDED READING:

Bormann & Golder. 2013. "Democratic Electoral Systems Around the World, 1946-2011." *Electoral Studies* 32: 360-369

Clark & Golder. 2006. "Rehabilitating Duverger's Theory: Testing the Mechanical and Strategic Modifying Effects of Electoral Laws." *Comparative Political Studies* 39(6): 679-708.

Amorim Neto & Cox. 1997. "Electoral Institutions, Cleavage Structures, and the Number of Parties." *American Journal of Political Science* 41(1): 149-174.

Chhibber & Kollman. 1998. "Party Aggregation and the Number of Parties in India and the United States." *American Political Science Review* 92(2): 329-342.

Week 10: October 25 - 29 – Bargaining Delays and Caretaker Governments. Midterm Review.

REQUIRED READING:

Clark et al. 2017. Excerpt from Chapter 12 ("Parliamentary, Presidential, and Semi-Presidential Democracies: Duration of Governments - Formation and Survival") in *Principles of Comparative Politics*. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Pages 482-483.

Golder. 2010. "Bargaining Delays in the Government Formation Process". *Comparative Political Studies* 43: 3-32.

Weill. 2011. "Constitutional Transitions: The Role of Lame Ducks and Caretakers." *Utah Law Review* 1087 (3).

RECOMMENDED READING:

Boston et al. 1998. "Caretaker Government and the evolution of Caretaker Conventions in New Zealand." *Victoria University of Wellington Law Review* 30.

Davis et al. 2001. "Rethinking Caretaker Conventions for Australian Governments." *Australian Journal of Public Administration* 60:11-26.

2nd Midterm Exam on Monday, November 1

Week 11: November 1 - 5 – Government Duration and Termination. Midterm 2.

REQUIRED READING:

Clark et al. 2017. Excerpt from Chapter 12 ("Parliamentary, Presidential, and Semi-Presidential Democracies: Duration of Governments - Formation and Survival") in *Principles of Comparative Politics*. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Pages 483-487.

Martinez-Gallardo. 2012. "Out of the Cabinet: What Drives Defections from the Government in Presidential Systems?" *Comparative Political Studies* 45(1): 62-90.

RECOMMENDED READING:

Conrad & Golder. 2010. "Measuring Government Duration and Stability in Central Eastern European Democracies". *European Journal of Political Research* 49: 119-150.

Llanos & Pérez-Liñán. 2021. "Oversight or Representation? Public Opinion and Impeachment Resolutions in Argentina and Brazil." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 46(2): 357-389.

Bernhard & Leblang. 2008. "Cabinet Collapses and Currency Crashes". *Political Research Quarterly* 61: 517-531.

Kim & Bahry. 2008. "Interrupted Presidencies in Third Wave Democracies." *The Journal of Politics* 70(3): 807-822.

Week 12: November 8 - 12 – Principal-Agent Models of Representation, Delegation & Bureaucracy

REQUIRED READING:

Clark et al. 2017. Excerpt from Chapter 12 ("Parliamentary, Presidential, and Semi-Presidential Democracies: A Unifying Framework" Principal-Agent and Delegation Problems") in *Principles of Comparative Politics*. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Pages 499-509.

Lupia. 2003. "Delegation and its Perils", in *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies* (eds. Strom, Muller, & Bergman). NY: Oxford. pp. 33-54.

Lipsmeyer & Pierce. 2011. "The Eyes that Bind: Junior Ministers as Oversight Mechanisms in Coalition Governments." *The Journal of Politics* 73(4): 1152-1164.

RECOMMENDED READING:

Martinez-Gallardo & Schleiter. 2015. "Choosing whom to trust: Agency Risks and Cabinet Partisanship in Presidential Democracies." *Comparative Political Studies* 48(2): 231-264.

Huber & Lupia. 2001. "Cabinet Instability and Delegation in Parliamentary Democracies." *American Journal of Political Science* 45(1): 18-32.

Huber, Shipan & Pfahler. 2001. "Legislatures and Statutory Control of Bureaucracy." *American Journal of Political Science*: 330-345.

Strøm. 2000. "Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies." *European Journal of Political Research* 37(3): 261-290.

McCubbins & Schwartz. 1984. "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms." *American Journal of Political Science* 28(1): 165-179.

Week 13: November 15 - 19 – Political and Economic Consequences of Government Types.

REQUIRED READING:

Bawn & Rosenbluth. 2006. "Short versus Long Coalitions: Electoral Accountability and the Size of the Public Sector." *American Journal of Political Science* 50(2): 251-265.

Epifanio. 2016. "The Politics of Targeted and Untargeted Counterterrorist Regulations." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 28(4): 713-734.

Riera & Pastor. 2021. "Cordons Sanitaires or Tainted Coalitions? The Electoral Consequences of Populist Participation in Government." *Party Politics* 1-14.

RECOMMENDED READING:

Jang. Forthcoming. "Power-sharing in Governments, Clarity of Responsibility, and the Control of Corruption". *Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration*.

Ariotti. 2021. "Government Type and Public Spending in Africa." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 46(1): 85-118.

Martin & Vanberg. 2014. "Parties and Policymaking in Multiparty Governments: The Legislative Median, Ministerial Autonomy, and the Coalition Compromise." *American Journal of Political Science* 58(4): 979-996.

Cheibub & Chernykh. 2009. "Are Semi-presidential Constitutions Bad for Democratic Performance?." *Constitutional Political Economy* 20(3): 202-229.

Indridason. 2008. "Does Terrorism Influence Domestic Politics? Coalition Formation and Terrorist Incidents." *Journal of Peace Research* 45(2): 241-260.

Tavits. 2007. "Clarity of Responsibility and Corruption". *American Journal of Political Science* 51(1): 218-229.

Bernhard & Leblang 2006. *Pricing Politics: Democratic Processes and Financial Markets*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1 and 6.

Thanksgiving Holiday (No Classes) on November 22 - 26

Week 14: November 29 - December 3 – Veto Players and Policy Change.

REQUIRED READING:

Clark et al. 2017. Excerpt from Chapter 15 ("Institutional Veto Players") in *Principles of Comparative Politics*. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Pages 679-688.

Tsebelis. 1995. "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism." *British Journal of Political Science* 25(3): 289-325.

RECOMMENDED READING:

Palanza & Gisela Sin. 2014. "Veto Bargaining and the Legislative Process in Multi-party Presidential Sys-

tems." *Comparative Political Studies* 47(5): 766–792.

Week 15: December 6 - 10 – Democratic Type, Government Stability, and Democratic Stability.

REQUIRED READING:

Clark et al. 2017. Excerpt from Chapter 16 (“Consequences of Democratic Institutions: Presidentialism and Democratic Survival”) in *Principles of Comparative Politics*. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Pages 762-780.

Elgie. 2012. "Chapter 1: The Perils of Semi-Presidentialism" in *Semi-Presidentialism: Sub-Types And Democratic Performance*. Oxford University Press: 1-18.

Higashijima & Kasuya. 2016. "The Peril of Parliamentarism? Executive–legislative Relations and the Transition to Democracy from Electoral Authoritarian Rule." European University Institute Working Paper Series MWP 2016/01.

RECOMMENDED READING:

Linz. 1990. "The Virtues of Parliamentarism." *Journal of Democracy* 1(4): 84

Linz 1990. "The Perils of Presidentialism." *Journal of Democracy* 1(1): 51-69.

Stepan & Skach. 1993. "Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism." *World Politics* 46(1): 1-22.

Mainwaring, 1993. "Presidentialism, Multipartyism, and Democracy: The Difficult Combination." *Comparative Political Studies* 26(2): 198-228.

Mainwaring & Shugart. 1997. "Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy: A Critical Appraisal." *Comparative Politics*: 449-471.

Cheibub. 2002. "Minority Governments, Deadlock Situations, and the Survival of Presidential Democracies." *Comparative political studies* 35(3): 284-312.

Final Exam TBA

Additional Information

COVID-19 Masking Guideline

Penn State University requires everyone to wear a face mask in all university buildings, including classrooms, regardless of vaccination status. ALL STUDENTS MUST wear a mask appropriately (i.e., covering both your mouth and nose) while you are indoors on campus. This is to protect your health and safety as well as the health and safety of your classmates, instructor, and the university community. Anyone attending class without a mask will be asked to put one on or leave. Instructors may end class if anyone present refuses to appropriately wear a mask for the duration of class. Students who refuse to wear masks appropriately may face disciplinary action for Code of Conduct violations. If you feel you cannot wear a mask during class, please speak with your adviser immediately about your options for altering your schedule.

Academic Integrity

Academic integrity is a basic guiding principle for all academic activity at The Pennsylvania State University, and all members of the University community are expected to act in accordance with this principle. Consistent with this expectation, the University's Code of Conduct states that all students should act with personal integrity, respect other students' dignity, rights and property, and help create and maintain an environment in which all can succeed through the fruits of their efforts.

Academic integrity includes a commitment by all members of the University community not to engage in or tolerate acts of falsification, misrepresentation or deception. Such acts of dishonesty violate the fundamental ethical principles of the University community and compromise the worth of work completed by others.

Students with questions about academic integrity should visit <http://www.la.psu.edu/> and then click on "Academic Integrity." Penn State defines academic integrity as "the pursuit of scholarly activity in an open, honest and responsible manner" (Senate Policy 49-20). Dishonesty of any kind will not be tolerated in this course. Dishonesty includes, but is not limited to, cheating, plagiarizing, fabricating information or citations, facilitating acts of academic dishonesty by others, having unauthorized possession of examinations, submitting work of another person or work previously used without permission from the instructor, or tampering with the academic work of other students. Students facing allegations of academic misconduct should not drop the course; those who do will be added to the course again and will be expected to complete course work and meet course deadlines. If the allegations are dismissed, then the drop will be permitted. Students found responsible for academic misconduct often receive academic sanctions, which can be severe, and put themselves at risk for disciplinary sanctions assigned by the University's Office of Student Conduct (see Senate Policy G-9).

Disability Accommodation

Penn State welcomes students with disabilities into the University's educational programs. Every Penn State campus has an office for students with disabilities. Student Disability Resources (SDR) website provides contact information for every Penn State campus (<http://equity.psu.edu/sdr/disability-coordinator>). For further information, please visit the Student Disability Resources website (<http://equity.psu.edu/sdr/>).

In order to receive consideration for reasonable accommodations, you must contact the appropriate disability services office at the campus where you are officially enrolled, participate in an intake interview, and provide documentation: See documentation guidelines at (<http://equity.psu.edu/sdr/guidelines>). If the documentation supports your request for reasonable accommodations, your campus disability services office will provide you with an accommodation letter. Please share this letter with your instructors and discuss the accommodations with them as early as possible. You must follow this process for every semester that you request accommodations.

Counseling and Psychological Services

Many students at Penn State face personal challenges or have psychological needs that may interfere with their academic progress, social development, or emotional wellbeing. The university offers a variety of confidential services to

help you through difficult times, including individual and group counseling, crisis intervention, consultations, online chats, and mental health screenings. These services are provided by staffs who welcome all students and embrace a philosophy respectful of clients' cultural and religious backgrounds, and sensitive to differences in race, ability, gender identity and sexual orientation.

Counseling and Psychological Services at University Park (CAPS) (<http://studentaffairs.psu.edu/counseling/>): 814-863-0395.

Penn State Crisis Line (24 hours/7 days/week): 877-229-6400. Crisis Text Line (24 hours/7 days/week): Text LIONS to 741741.

Extended Absences

During your enrollment at Penn State, unforeseen challenges may arise. If you ever need to miss an extended amount of class in such a circumstance, please notify your professor so you can determine the best course of action to make up missed work. If your situation rises to a level of difficulty you cannot manage on your own with faculty support, reach out to the Student Care & Advocacy office by phone at (814-863-2020) or email them at StudentCare@psu.edu.

Educational Equity

Penn State takes great pride to foster a diverse and inclusive environment for students, faculty, and staff. Consistent with University Policy AD29, students who believe they have experienced or observed a hate crime, an act of intolerance, discrimination, or harassment that occurs at Penn State are urged to report these incidents as outlined on the University's Report Bias webpage (<http://equity.psu.edu/reportbias/>).